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Abstract
This article argues that the CJEU’s use of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in 
situations falling within the scope of EU law needs to be supplemented by clearer 
constitutional reasoning about the role of fundamental rights in the public order of the 
European Union. The article demonstrates, through an analysis of the Charter’s 
drafting context, that the primary function of this instrument is to highlight the 
centrality of a set of public goods in the EU, rather than merely to add to the number 
of individual rights to which EU law gives rise. It is then argued that, in order for this 
function to be fulfilled, an interpretation of fundamental rights is required that both 
acknowledges their constitutional value as distinct from other sources of rights 
protection in the Union and offers adequate reasons for the application of the Charter 
standard. The idea of public justification provides a suitable starting point, 
particularly in situations of conflict with national laws, because it would give rise to a 
much-needed judicial debate about what the best standard of fundamental rights 
protection would be for the Union. However, such an interpretation of the Charter is 
currently lacking from the case law which, instead, utilises problematic forms of 
constitutional and quasi-constitutional discourse, through continued reliance on a 
conception of rights as tools of enforcement of EU law, which it had advanced in its 
earlier case law. While this type of reasoning was well suited to the idea of the EU as 
a social market economy, it structurally precludes the re-imagination of rights as 
collectively authored claims about good government under the Charter framework. 
Keywords
Charter – EUCFR – reasoning – constitutionalism – justification – public sphere – EU 
public law – fundamental rights
I. Introduction
Several years ago, Douglas-Scott wrote that ‘the EU already has some sort of 
Constitution.’1 That was the case not only in the broad, terminological sense that its 
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operation could be defined by reference to a specific set of rules,2 but also in a deeper 
legal sense. Its foundational treaties revealed an order delivered through a variety of 
institutions, set up a system of checks and balances, and identified ascertainable 
rights.3 For Douglas-Scott, the key question was how, since that constitution was 
imperfect, it could be reformed to sustain a developing, and more discursive, EU-wide 
democracy. She had then called for new forms of public reason (or justification) to be 
developed, which would involve a conception of justice ensuing from rational 
argumentation about the common good.4 
Building upon this analysis, this article focuses on the potential of one aspect 
of the EU constitutional order in particular in providing the impetus for public 
justification: the introduction, initially as a non-binding declaratory instrument and, 
subsequently, as a binding rights list, of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(hereafter ‘Charter’ or ‘EUCFR’). The reason for this focus is that, as claims with 
strong links to existing national identities and visions of the good life, fundamental 
rights have been both a unifying characteristic and a key point of contestation of the 
boundaries of EU constitutionalism.5 National courts have always challenged the 
primacy principle in this field,6 highlighting the need for new forms of constitutional 
discourse. In turn, the article advances two principal claims. On the one hand, it 
argues that the Charter rendered public justification a feasible and desirable prospect 
for EU fundamental rights law. Insofar as it signified a commitment to those rights as 
commonly authored constitutional guarantees, it could serve as a starting point for 
substantive analysis of the merits of their different interpretations. On the other hand, 
the Court’s current methodology stalls such a possibility. The Court has not 
acknowledged the break with prior case law that the Charter, in light of its discernibly 








 See JHH Weiler, ‘Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries: On Standards and Values in the 
Protection of Human Rights’ in NA Newall and A Rosas (eds), The European Union and Human 
Rights (Kluwer 1995) 51, 51-52.
6
 Solange II – BverfGE 73, 339 (Az: 2 BvR 197/83); G Anagnostaras, ‘Solange III? Fundamental Rights 
Protection under National Identity Review’ (2017) 42:2 ELRev 234.  In the UK context, see: Thoburn 
v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin); R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of 
State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3.
‘Constitutional Reasoning and the EU Charter’, European Public Law (2019) 25(2) 
3
cautious incrementalism often operating through ‘shadow effects’,7 rather than robust 
public justification that uses the constitutional settlement as its point of departure.8
The argument develops in the following manner. Firstly, through an analysis 
of its drafting context, the article demonstrates that the Charter was intended to signal 
a shift in the Union’s constitutional identity, as its symbolism as a predominantly 
republican commitment to rights, rather than its content as such, was its key import 
(Section II). Secondly, it is argued that there is a mismatch between such an 
understanding of the Charter and the Court’s case law to date. As illustrated in section 
III, while references to the Charter have added to a long tradition of the protection of 
rights in the Union, the case law appears to respond to an individual, case-by-case 
conception of justice, rather than a broader conception of the EU public good. The 
constitutionality of EU law has continued to stem from an uncompromising 
conception of the principle of supremacy,9 which does not distinguish provisions 
labelled ‘fundamental’ from those with a more functional character in the EU legal 
order.10 The idea of ‘balancing’ different interests in the enforcement of EU law thus 
takes centre stage in the Court’s analysis, resulting in a model of constitutional 
discourse which is especially unsuited to the Charter, if the latter is understood as an 
essential precondition of legitimacy for other aspects of EU law and, indeed, a 
structural component of the EU public sphere. 
Finally, section IV argues that, against a codified fundamental rights 
framework, the setting out of mutually adequate reasons for adopting a particular 
interpretation of rights should, still, be more confidently assumed by the Court of 
Justice. This could enable the development, if not of agreement on the merits, at least 
of more discursive, iterative forms of constitutionality in the Union than the case law 
7
 C Barnard, ‘The Charter, the Court – and the Crisis’ (2013) Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series, Paper no 18/2013, <http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/ssrn/>, accessed 8/01/2018, 8-9.
8
 The view that the Charter should form the starting point of the Court’s rulings had been expressed 
powerfully by Advocate General Cruz Villalón in his Opinion in Prigge, but was not followed by the 
Court: Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, delivered on 19 May 2011, in Case C-447/09 
Prigge and Others v Deutsche Lufthansa, EU:C:2011:321, para 26.
9
 See Case C-399/11, Melloni, EU:C:2013:107, paras 56-60; See also LFM Besselink, ‘The Parameters 
of Constitutional Conflict after Melloni’ (2014) 39:4 EL Rev 531, 545: the trend in Melloni can be 
contrasted to more nuanced utterances of primacy in the fundamental rights context previously, in cases 
like Omega and Sayn Wittgenstein, which had been more mindful of national constitutional differences. 
See Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- Und Automatenaufstellungs v Oberbürgemeisterin Der 
Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609; Case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von 
Wien [2010] ECR I-13693.
10
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European Law Journal 460, 469-471.
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has so far provided.11 A shift away from the terminology of balancing of individual 
interests to that of justification of rights based on the common good would amount to 
a procedurally more principled means of constitutional reasoning in the EU legal 
order that could, eventually, enable conflicting views about the proper reach of EU 
constitutionalism to be more fully developed – and ultimately resolved – in their 
appropriate locus: the political realm. 
II.  The symbolic value of the Charter in EU constitutionalism
The Charter has often been understood as a document which does not introduce new 
rights, but merely enhances the visibility of existing rights within EU law, as is clear 
from its Preamble.12 That has been a source of doubt regarding its constitutional 
value, not only in the Member States but also within the Union’s institutions: 
empirical research at the Court of Justice has revealed that the attribution of binding 
effect to the Charter did not alter judges’ perceptions of how they should decide 
fundamental rights cases.13 Respondents generally felt that there was no reason to 
change their existing fundamental rights discourse, because fundamental rights were 
already ‘for the informed observer, there in the Court’s case law prior to the entry into 
force of the Charter, in the form of general principles.’14 
While the question of whether the Charter created or bolstered rights merits 
further analysis, particularly in respect of rights associated with data protection, 
public administration, and solidarity (which it elevated to fundamental status),15 the 
idea that its contribution to the EU legal order should be assessed solely, or even 
primarily, based on how much content it added to fundamental rights protection in the 
11
 See N Walker, ‘The Rule of Law in the EU: Necessity’s Mixed Virtue’ in G Palombella and N 
Walker (eds), Relocating the Rule of Law (Bloomsbury 2008) 129.
12
 House of Lords EU Select Committee, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: An Impact Assessment’ (HL Paper 62, 
August 2007) paras 5.37–5.41. 
13
 S Morano-Foadi and S Andreadakis, ‘Reflections on the Architecture of the EU after the Treaty of 
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Union is problematic. As public law claims, fundamental rights do not only recognise 
basic needs, but also define how a political community can be legitimately 
governed.16 Geneviève Souillac has usefully pointed out that, particularly when 
constitutional transitions are taking place, fundamental rights lists assume an 
‘architectural role’.17 They have a constructional function for a nascent public sphere 
because they institutionalise the conditions for ‘appropriate forms of governance’ to 
be developed and provide structural legitimacy to newly founded political institutions 
and processes.18 Its drafting history indeed confirms that the Charter was intended to 
have a function of collective identity building within a changing framework of deeper 
political integration. 
While the Charter only acquired binding legal force as part of the Lisbon 
Treaty, the idea of the EU as ‘far more than a market’, but rather as ‘a unique design 
based on common values’ had been made clear already by the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference.19 The Charter was drafted soon afterwards, at the 
Cologne European Council in 1999, taking over the recommendations put forth in an 
influential report by Professor Simitis, which had expressed the worry that it was no 
longer sufficient for EU fundamental rights to mirror the ECHR but that, rather, a 
European bill of rights reflecting the ‘Union experience’ was required.20 Its 
symbolism as a platform for a minimum common constitutional identity is, in turn, 
key in understanding the Charter’s role in the EU project as an instrument that is more 
about legitimacy and identification than it is about new human rights standards.21 
While the Charter’s substantive provisions were not drastically altered since its non-
binding declaration in the Treaty of Nice, it was only under the negotiations 
16
 In this article, I use the term ‘public law’ to denote the law applicable to the process of governing: M 
Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (OUP 2003) 5-7; M Loughlin, The Foundations of Public Law (OUP 
2010) 108. 
17
 G Souillac, ‘From Global Norms to Local Change: Theoretical Perspectives on the Promotion of 
Human Rights in Societies in Transition’ in SA Horowitz and A Schnabel (eds), Human Rights and 
Societies in Transition: Causes, Consequences, Responses (United Nations University Press 2004) 77, 
79. 
18
 Ibid, 81, 93; J Habermas, ‘Remarks on legitimation through human rights’ in J Habermas, The 
Postnational Constellation (M Pensky tr, Polity Press 2001) 117. 
19
 A Strategy for Europe’, Final Report of the Reflection Group on the 1996 Intergovernmental 
Conference, SN 520/95, 5 December 1995, iii; PP Craig, ‘Democracy and Rule-making within the EC: 
An Empircal and Normative Assessment’ (1997) 3:2 ELJ 105, 113.
20
 European Commission Expert Group on Fundamental Rights, Affirming Fundamental Rights in the 
European Union: Time to Act (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 1999) 10.
21
 J Baquero Cruz, ‘What's Left of the Charter? Reflections on Law and Political Mythology’ (2008) 
15:1 Maastricht Journal 65, 65-66.
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concerning the Constitutional Treaty that it would acquire its current preamble, a 
more defined scope of application and, crucially, a binding legal status. As De Burca 
and Aschenbrenner note, ‘[t]he decision to confer legal status on the Charter is thus 
necessarily linked with the discussion on a constitution for Europe and especially with 
the political debate on the future shape of the EU.’22 
In other words, even if its content is not new as such, the Charter selects, 
collects and narrates fundamental rights in a novel manner from the perspective of EU 
law. As Paul Craig has put it, ‘the very fact of putting those pre-existing provisions in 
a thing called a Charter of Fundamental Rights’23 was a constitutionally significant 
exercise. The designation of a group of rights as ‘fundamental’ was intended to give 
these rights independent interpretative value vis-à-vis Member State and international 
standards, not necessarily by antagonising them, but by setting out the arrangements 
considered the best possible based on the political morality of the European Union, 
rather than being reducible to external standards alone.24 Furthermore, the Charter is 
addressed to EU citizens as a public characterised by a commitment to an underlying 
set of common values and, most importantly, one that puts that commitment into 
effect by exercising authorship.25 Unlike the preambles of the TEU and TFEU, which 
refer only to the heads of state, the Charter’s Preamble retains the formulation used in 
the Constitutional Treaty. It proclaims that ‘the peoples of Europe, in creating an ever 
closer union among them, are resolved to share a peaceful future based on common 
22
 G De Burca and B Aschenbrenner, ‘The Development Of European Constitutionalism And The Role 
Of The EU Charter Of Fundamental Rights’ (2003) 9 Columbia Journal of European Law 355, 364–
65.
23
 See PP Craig, European Scrutiny Committee, ‘Oral evidence: The Application of the EU Charter of 
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25
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values.’26 That is a remarkable statement. It situates the person ‘at the heart’ of the 
Union’s activities27 and suggests that the language of fundamental rights is a code to 
which European institutions, the Member States and, crucially, their peoples, commit. 
It can thus best be understood as an attempt to distil – or even to construct – a 
collective ‘we’ to which EU citizens from different states would relate, adding 
structure to novel concepts at the time, such as EU citizenship, and aspirations, such 
as federalisation.28
In turn, the application of the Charter can be distinguished, at least at the level 
of justification, from the application of rights within EU law to date, which mostly 
attached these claims to the exercise of market freedoms, even though in some cases 
very loosely,29 or to compliance with global and European human rights standards. 
The story the Charter tells runs in parallel with the economic freedoms: it is not 
primarily concerned with ‘conventional’ questions of EU law, such as free trade or 
competition. Rather, it defines how the EU should operate at the most basic level as a 
Union which, albeit not brought together in federal terms, has undeniably political 
aspirations of both an institutional character (e.g. a parliamentary body) and of a 
substantive character (e.g. through competences in fields such as citizenship, 
monetary, and social policy). Indeed, what sets the Charter apart from other sources of 
fundamental rights protection, such as the general principles of EU law and respect 
for the ECHR, is that it has a political dimension, as its interpretation does not only 
concern the individuals affected by a breach of a fundamental right, but also the way 
in which the EU as a broader political community has chosen to organise itself.30 The 
significance of the status that the provisions in question acquire through the Charter 
consists, precisely, in their function of setting up the basic parameters of the Union’s 
public order.
26




 See P Eeckhout, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question’ (2002) 39 
Common Market Law Review 945.
29
 Most illustratively, Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(2002) ECR I-7091; Case C-200/02, Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2004] ECR I-09925; Case C-34/09 Zambrano v Office national de 
l’emploi [2011] I-01177.
30
 R Alexy, ‘Individual Rights and Collective Goods’, in C S Nino (ed), Rights (NYU Press, 1992) 163, 
164–165. See also PW Kahn, ‘Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory’ (1989) 99 Yale 
Law Journal 1, 20-28; B Ackerman, ‘The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution’ (1984) 93 
Yale Law Journal 1013, 1040-1043.
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However, the Charter’s constitutional symbolism currently lacks articulation 
in the Court’s rulings. On the one hand, the Court has made plain its intention to give 
effect to specific provisions of the Charter, such as non-discrimination, in order to 
effectuate changes in EU law and policy.31 There is also little to be questioned insofar 
as the Court’s willingness to strike down EU legislation based on human rights issues 
is concerned;32 or in the setting of requirements for Member States to comply with 
Charter provisions over the years.33 On the other hand, though, as section III 
demonstrates, a closer look at the development of the Court’s reasoning in 
fundamental rights case law confirms, as interviews at the Court of Justice had indeed 
suggested,34 uncertainty about the Charter’s overall significance as a means of 
constitutionalisation, and an unwillingness to distinguish it from the existing case law 
based on the general principles of EU law. Yet, as the latter had emerged 
predominantly in response to conflicts with national constitutional courts, it lacked 
overall conceptual coherence by reference to the values underpinning the protection 
of fundamental rights in EU law.35 As such, it is limited in representing the Charter, if 
this instrument is understood, in light of its drafting context and Preamble, as an 
attempt to create a stronger linkage between the fundamental rights protected in EU 
law and the Union’s emerging public sphere.36
III. The Charter as missed opportunity for constitutionalisation: reasoning about 
fundamental rights in the Court’s case law
The constitutional fabric of the Charter can be contrasted to the broader construction 
of EU law as a hybrid structure possessing a mix of public and private law features. In 
the market-building process, the completion of which was a pre-requisite of further 
integration, the constitutionalisation of the economic freedoms by the Court of Justice 
31
 Barnard (n 7) 4.
32
 Ibid; Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Schecke and Eifert v Land Hessen [2010] ECR I-11063; 
Case C-236/09, Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL v Conseil des ministres 
[2011] ECR I-00773. 
33
 Barnard (n 7) 5-6. 
34
 Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis (n 13).
35
 A Williams, ‘Taking Values Seriously: Towards a Philosophy of EU Law’ (2009) 23:1 OJLS 549, 
567.
36
 On the inherent nature of this relationship, see J Habermas, ‘On the Internal Relation between the 
Rule of Law and Democracy’ in J Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory 
(Polity Press 1999) 258-262; JS Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond. Liberals, Critics, 
Contestations (OUP 2000) 48.
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transformed private law into constitutional law.37 As exemplified in the Van Gend en 
Loos ruling, the Court’s case law rested predominantly upon an understanding of 
rights as individual interests in the application of EU law.38 The private enforcement 
of rights served as an avenue for integration which, historically, contributed to settling 
organisational questions that eventually developed into Charter rights. For example, 
most notably in the field of fundamental rights, in Defrenne II the Court had held that, 
in addition to ensuring that undertakings operating in Member States which had 
implemented the right to equal pay do not suffer a ‘competitive disadvantage’ within 
the single market,39 this right also
forms part of the social objectives of the community, which is not merely an 
economic union, but is at the same time intended, by common action, to 
ensure social progress and seek the constant improvement of the living and 
working conditions of its peoples, as is emphasised by the Preamble to the 
Treaty […]. This double aim, which is at once economic and social, shows 
that the principle of equal pay forms part of the foundations of the 
Community.40 
In the 1976 context, the effect of the Defrenne ruling was not simply to 
include women in a marketplace in which they were disadvantaged. At the same time, 
in recognising their right to be paid equally with men for their work, it enabled 
women meaningfully to participate in the market as an institution with substantial 
political influence, and thus more fully to take part in public life. The Court thereby 
recognised that the single market had social dimensions, and that its purpose was not 
just to ensure economic integration as an end in itself but, rather, a form of integration 
that resulted in the improvement of living and working conditions in the EU. In this 
sense, it substantively engaged with the public law dimensions of the European Union 
at the time, even if these could only have come about, in light of the limited nature of 
the Treaties, through the discourse surrounding the free market. Still, rather than 
attributing the decision to the higher significance of non-discrimination as a 
37
 C Joerges, ‘The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist Perceptions, True 
Conflicts and a New Constitutional Perspective’ (1997) 3:4 European Law Journal 378, 383.
38
 JHH Weiler, ‘The Individual as Subject and Object and the Dilemma of European 
Legitimacy’ (2014) 12:1 ICON 94, 103. 
39
 Case 43/75, Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455, para 9.
40
 Ibid, paras 10-12.
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foundational goal of the EU project, as the Advocate General had suggested,41 the 
Court spoke only of the ‘interest’ of private parties in having Treaty rules observed 
under the umbrella of the Union’s ‘double aim’, which was ‘at once economic and 
social’.42 It thus failed explicitly to identify priorities amongst considerations that are 
constitutionally relevant in the Union and introduced a problematic conception of 
balancing between fundamental rights and market freedoms. 
This approach found new expressions in the case law over the years. For 
example, in referring to Defrenne in Viking three decades later, the Court used this 
ruling in a manner that marginalised its dynamic construction of rights in a changed 
European constitutional framework. The Court referred to Defrenne in a formalistic 
way, as a justification of the restriction of a fundamental social right in order to affirm 
market freedoms enshrined in the Treaty.43 Yet, it did not consider how the Defrenne 
ruling could be translated into the post-Maastricht constitutional framework of the 
Union, which had become far more complex through the introduction of political 
symbols, such as a supranational citizenship and the Charter, albeit at the time non-
binding.44 Instead, the ‘double aim,’ to which the Court had referred in justifying the 
imposition of an obligation to observe a fundamental right in Defrenne45 was used as 
a justification for directly balancing the duty to observe a market freedom against the 
fundamental right to strike, without an assessment of how the market freedom on the 
one hand and the fundamental right on the other could fulfil their respective 
organisational functions within the very different social context of the early ’00s. 
Thus, while in Defrenne the emphasis on the duality of the Union’s goals meant going 
beyond merely economic integration in the single market and acknowledging the 
emergence of a broader public order, the use of the same phrase in Viking had the 
opposite effect, when assessed against the political aspirations set in motion by the 
Maastricht treaty.  
41
 Opinion of Advocate General Trabucchi, delivered on 10 March 1976, in Case 43/75, Defrenne v 
Sabena [1976] ECR 455, 490. See also E Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational 
Constitution’ (1981) 75:1 AJIL 1, 20.
42
 Defrenne (n 39) para 31.
43
 Case C-438/05, The International Transport Workers' Federation & The Finnish Seamen's Union v 
Viking Line. ABP & Oü Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779, paras 58-59. 
44
 Most notably, see Article 8 of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ C191/01.
45
 Defrenne (n 39) paras 10-12.
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Such an analysis has persisted in post-2009 jurisprudence, which is 
characterised by avoidance of more detailed constitutional reasoning46 and reliance on 
the idea of balancing for interpreting the Charter. For instance, in Alemo-Herron, the 
Court was faced with a case concerning, on the one hand, the freedom to conduct a 
business enshrined in Article 16 of the Charter47 and, on the other hand, the interests 
of employees in the context of the transfer of the undertaking in question from the 
public sector to the private sector, negotiated through collective bargaining. The Court 
sought to reach a ‘fair balance’48 between these sides, ultimately finding that the 
employees’ interests in collective action prejudiced ‘the very essence’ of the freedom 
to conduct a business.49 
In this context, however, the resort to balancing resulted in a deep failure to 
interpret and, if required, to adjust the rights in question based on the set of values 
represented by the Charter’s provisions.50 The freedom to conduct a business is 
usually thought to protect the right to engage in business activity, rather than securing 
a right to run one’s business free from regulatory constraints or from the implications 
of employee protection.51 The Court’s broad interpretation of Article 16 suggested a 
preference for a specific conception of that provision, the grounds for which were not 
explored in the ruling. Moreover, regardless of whether one accepts the salience of 
such a conception of Article 16 or not, the Court did not acknowledge a constitutional 
obligation to assess, similarly, the implications of that interpretation for the right to 
collective bargaining, which is also protected in the Charter, under Article 28 thereof, 
rather than being an abstract interest. This provision was not mentioned in the ruling. 
46
 See L Pech, ‘Between Judicial Minimalism and Avoidance: The Court of Justice’s Sidestepping of 
Fundamental Constitutional Issues in Römer and Dominguez' (2012) 49:6 CML Rev 1841.
47
 Article 16 EUCFR. Notably, the freedom to conduct a business before incorporation in the Charter 
was a general principle of EU law, unlike social rights, such as the right to be informed and consulted 
within the undertaking: Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 31 May 2016 in Case C-
157/15, Achbita and Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v G4S Secure 
Solutions NV, EU:C:2016:382, para 134; see also Case 4/73, Nold v Commission, EU:C:1974:51, paras 
13-14; Case 44/79, Hauer, EU:C:1979:290, paras 15, 16 and 32; Joined Cases C-453/03, C-11/04, 
C-12/04 and C-194/04, ABNA and Others, EU:C:2005:741, para 87; and Case C-544/10, Deutsches 
Weintor, EU:C:2012:526, para 54.
48
 Case C-426/11, Alemo-Herron and Others v Parkwood Leisure Ldt, ECLI:EU:C:2013:521, para 25.
49
 Ibid, para 35.
50
 See T Scanlon, ‘Adjusting Rights and Balancing Values’ (2004) 72:5 Fordham L Rev 1477, 1481.
51
 J Prassl, ‘Freedom of Contract as a General Principle of EU Law? Transfers of Undertakings and the 
Protection of Employer Rights in EU Labour Law (Case C-426/11 Alemo-Herron v Parkwood 
Leisure)’ (2013) 42 Industrial Law Journal 434; J Prassl, ‘Business Freedoms and Employment Rights 
in the European Union’ (2015) 17 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 189; S Weatherill, 
‘Use and Abuse of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights: On the Improper Veneration of ‘Freedom 
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The problems with this approach from the perspective of fundamental rights 
protection are plain: firstly, what comes within the ambit of a fundamental right is in 
itself a searching question that requires argumentative support, which cannot be 
superseded by balancing.52  The vagueness with which the Court has dealt with the 
content of the relevant rights appears to trade ‘inclusiveness for superficiality’ as, by 
failing to set the relevant threshold or limit for finding that a fundamental right is 
engaged, it does not weed out justifications that can prejudice its very purpose.53 
Secondly, even if the Court had acknowledged the constitutional significance of 
Article 28, and thus engaged with both of the affected rights in fuller terms, its 
methodology would still risk structurally excluding a large set of Charter provisions 
from meaningful constitutional review, despite their equal constitutional status. Social 
rights and, particularly, labour rights, necessarily lose out when subjected to the 
terminology of balancing, because their effectiveness depends precisely on their 
potential to suspend an employer’s pursuit of economic activities, rather than being 
balanced with it.54 The key constitutional question at stake in this case was a potential 
clash, not of competing interests of private parties, but of the Union’s economic and 
social goals themselves. As such, it necessarily required an assessment of which of 
those considerations constitutionally rank higher in EU law and how different values 
should be reconciled in the interpretation of Charter provisions.
Still, it might be argued that Alemo-Herron, which is drawn from the contested 
‘Solidarity’ chapter of the Charter, is an uncharacteristic example of the Court’s case 
law. It is therefore important to emphasise the centrality of the reasoning described 
above to cases spanning across the Charter’s different sets of provisions, such as 
Google (balancing the right to private life and an interest of access to information)55, 
Melloni (balancing the right to an effective remedy and the principle of uniformity)56, 
and, perhaps most strikingly, Achbita57 and Bougnaoui.58 The latter two cases, which 
52
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concerned the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in the workplace, illustrate the Court’s 
use of such a discourse even in the field that has pride of place in EU fundamental 
rights law, that of non-discrimination, thus highlighting its unease with assessing the 
role of rights in the public sphere in cases perceived as overly political.59 
The main issue in both cases was the employees’ choice to start wearing a 
headscarf at work against the employer’s policy and a client’s wishes, respectively. 
Setting out the appropriate limits between respect for the private sphere and the public 
expression and manifestation of religion and belief (e.g. through dress) was, therefore, 
crucial. However, in contrast to Advocate General Sharpston’s eloquent Opinion in 
Bougnaoui, the Court did not discuss the role of the workplace in public life and the 
effects of bans on religious attire within it.60 Rather, by examining the cases solely on 
the basis of discrimination by private employers against a specific characteristic that 
these individuals possessed, the Court was able to balance the employers’ freedom to 
conduct a business with the right not to be discriminated against on grounds of 
religious belief, finding for the applicant in Bougnaoui, and not quite so in Achbita, 
where it left the national court to decide whether she had been, in fact, discriminated 
against. 
These cases leave the reader with a sense of surprise that the freedom of 
religion, protected in Article 10 EUCFR, did not at all feature in the Court’s analysis 
of what should fall within the relevant balance.61 By focusing on discrimination at 
work as a private harm, the Court did not capture the broader nature of the protection 
of religious belief as an element of a democratic society, nor did it assess whether its 
manifestation in the workplace was an essential component of its effective exercise.62 
Crucially, it also did not articulate in what way the freedom to conduct a business 
amounted not only to a potential justification of indirect discrimination, but at the 
same time to a legitimate restriction of Article 10, insofar as that right protects 
58
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religion ‘in public or in private’, as well as its manifestation through ‘observance or 
practice’.63 As above, one could argue that the idea of a democratic society in the EU 
comprises corporate image as an adequate bar on the right to publicly manifest 
religion. That would almost certainly have been a position attracting critique, as it 
would have openly conflicted with the human rights jurisprudence to which the Court 
readily referred.64 Nonetheless, it would have been a justification for placing a limit to 
the fundamental right to manifest religion in the specific constitutional context of the 
European Union, which could have invited rational disagreement, rather than mere 
uncertainty about the Union’s stance towards these questions.65 
This approach is indicative of a broader problem within EU public law. As 
Dieter Grimm has noted, the lack of a meaningful relationship between the Court’s 
decisions and the EU public sphere can be attributed to the over-constitutionalisation 
of EU law, whereby the Treaties at large make up the Union’s ‘constitutional 
charter.’66 This has meant that the assertion of a private interest in the application of 
the Treaties by ‘vigilant’ individuals – to paraphrase the famous paragraph of the Van 
Gend en Loos judgment – is automatically translated into a constitutionally worthy 
cause, without an analysis of the characteristics of constitutional rights as 
foundational for other aspects of Union law.67 By conceptualising rights through the 
vindication of private interests, EU law does not distinguish questions of public 
concern from technical aspects of the functioning of the Union, or present a vision of 
the public good that can be separated from the interests of particular actors. As 
Streeck notes, though, in contrast to bare markets, polities ‘rather than simply serving 
the idiosyncratic wants of individuals […] must subject them to public examination 
with the objective of aggregating them into a general will, which bundles and 
supersedes the many individual wills.’68 In not doing so, EU law fails to move beyond 
a private-centric, ad hoc conception of justice and to acquire – or to acknowledge the 
63
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value of – legitimation by appeal to political decisions.69 Rather, in the Court’s 
analysis, both the significance of the constitutionalisation of fundamental rights in the 
Charter and the broader, common values that underpinned their creation seem to have 
‘dwindled into the background.’70
This is at odds with the collective dimensions inherent in a fundamental rights 
catalogue as a politically constructional device. The abovementioned cases do not 
have a merely private or case-specific character. They pertain to a changing 
constitutional domain in which competing ideologies seek legitimation through rights 
and where rights often provide the means through which different actors lay down 
their vision of what the Union is or should become. As Ingram notes, ‘far from being 
the apolitical basis of politics, rights are vehicles of politicisation.’71 They are used by 
individual claimants and broader political movements alike, as demonstrated in cases 
where rights are relied upon to shield an aspect of one’s identity (such as their gender 
or religious belief) from attack in society (for instance, through an employment 
practice).72
While the Court’s position need not mean a poor overall human rights record, 
it is therefore criticisable from a normative standpoint, whereby the legitimacy of the 
market as a starting point for further EU integration may be challenged.73 It is also 
criticisable from a procedural standpoint, as it suggests a lack of fit of the reasons 
supplied to a changing EU constitutional framework. Both the way in which the Court 
selects what amounts to a right, rather than an interest, and the balance it reaches 
between the different individual entitlements to which EU law gives rise marginalise 
the significance of the constitutional moment as a legitimate driver of change and as a 
step towards more political forms of EU constitutionalism. In turn, in the absence of 
moral evaluation of the content and reach of the protected rights, the Court naturally 
69
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struggles with cases that concern multiple or cross-sectional fundamental rights 
questions, such as those raised by religious discrimination in the workplace. There, 
while the concept of a fair balance creates a mirage of precision in the relevant 
standard of justice, rather than being perceived as an arbitrary standard, it largely 
overlooks the intricacies of fundamental rights as claims that are not always 
‘amenable to quantification.’74 Indeed, the Charter’s provisions can be understood as 
being already reflective of an adequate balance between different interests, reached 
during its drafting process – a process which had, for instance, resulted in the 
exclusion of the four original market freedoms from its final text, placing therein only 
the free movement and residence of persons.75
It follows that, when assessed against the Charter framework, the Court’s 
approach suggests not an exercise of restraint, but a form of meta-constitutional 
review of which aspects of that instrument are suitable or unsuitable to the existing 
constitutional toolbox, rather than delineating Charter provisions themselves as the 
bases for judicial review. It appears to be premised on a distinct philosophy, which 
still sees a functional, incremental form of integration through law as a sufficient and 
generally effective form of adjudication, capable of delivering justice in the Union 
even ‘without the involvement of politics.’76 Trying to marry the ambition of 
authorship in the Charter with the conception of justice stemming from the case law, 
which is based largely on ‘delimiting spheres of individual freedom’77 can then seem 
to be an almost impossible task. A shift in judicial reasoning is required in order for 
the Charter to assume a more meaningful role as a source of common constitutional 
foundations for the EU polity - a role it was by design intended to play.   
IV. Public justification as constitutional discourse about the Charter
What might amount to a more apposite form of fundamental rights reasoning at the 
EU level? A suitable alternative to the existing discourse can be found, as Douglas-
74
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Scott had highlighted, in the idea of public justification.78 While primarily associated 
with political reasoning, public justification is a key function of constitutional 
adjudication within a discursive democratic framework, particularly where multiple 
constitutional actors operate, because it highlights the need for adequate and explicit 
analysis of the aims which are compatible with the recognition of a fundamental right. 
The entry into force of the Charter justifies a methodological shift in favour of such 
an approach, because it enables the Court to avoid a discourse of what must be 
safeguarded a priori (as was the case, for example, with the development of the 
general principles of EU law) and to focus instead on which interpretation most 
convincingly corresponds to an existing, and politically sanctioned, constitutional 
right. By emphasising the visible, ascertainable act of formal constitutionalisation, it 
offers a starting point for building a discourse about how best to organise our common 
life on the basis of the rules we have thereby set out.79 
Such an approach places rights within a political, and not a metaphysical, 
conception of justice.80 Within a framework where there may be disagreement about 
what is, ultimately, the common good, public reason must begin ‘from some 
consensus, that is, from premises that we and others publicly recognize as true.’81 It 
thus puts an emphasis on the constitutional text and the values that underpin it as a 
collective project, rather than through an affirmation of absolute primacy. As Rawls 
himself explained, ‘public justification is not simply valid reasoning, but argument 
addressed to others: it proceeds correctly from premises we accept and think others 
could reasonably accept to conclusions we think they could also reasonably accept.’82 
We can then come to favour a particular interpretation of a right – or, if we must use 
the balancing terminology – we might attribute weight to one consideration more than 
others, because doing so embodies a broader value that the constitutional order 
78
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protects, 83 as long as the terms of justification are clearly defined in a manner that can 
be reasonably accepted by all involved.84 
In practical terms, this means that the Court should start its analysis from a 
thorough interpretation of the appropriate content and ambit of the protected rights 
themselves. In this regard, the use of comparative law could be one of the key 
justificatory tools at the Court’s disposal, as it can reveal strengths and deficiencies of 
the various interpretations of a right as well as offering grounds for differentiation. At 
present, while the Court states that it draws inspiration from the constitutional 
traditions of the Member states in reaching a particular conclusion, it does not engage 
in a precise analysis of these traditions or refer to the judgments of its national 
counterparts in its rulings.85 As Bruno De Witte has suggested, the Court ‘could be 
less vague about the “common constitutional traditions” by venturing, when a case so 
warrants, into a genuine comparative evaluation of Member State constitutions; this 
would make a rejection of the arguments taken from the law of just one State more 
compelling […], particularly in the field of fundamental rights.’86 
Still, whilst constitutional comparison might be sufficient in cases of 
overwhelming consensus about the correct interpretation of the Charter, where there is 
real disagreement about the boundaries of a fundamental right, the Court would have 
to resort to additional means of justification. In such cases, it could be guided by 
principled references to the values which led to the protection of a right in the EU in 
the first place.87 However, an abstract articulation of values premised upon references 
to inward-looking general principles, such as the primacy, uniformity, or continuity of 
EU law, would not be sufficient, as these may not be recognised as inherently virtuous 
by other constitutional actors.88 It has been clear for some time, for instance, that 
conflicts of interpretation will not be resolved by mere appeal to the primacy 
83
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principle, insofar as national constitutional courts do not accept its salience in the 
fundamental rights context.89 Rather, complying with the requirements of public 
reason in this field would entail that the values guiding the interpretation of the 
Charter’s provisions can be seen to correspond to the EU fundamental rights 
framework in its current form, and that they are ‘rooted’ in the specific constitutional 
context that gave rise to the Charter,90 so that a claim to their political legitimacy can 
be convincingly sustained vis-à-vis constitutional actors whose interest in EU 
integration may be ancillary to the protection of fundamental rights. 
As already argued by Von Bogdandy and others, such a set of values is listed 
in Article 2 TEU, and their acceptance can be understood as a condition of freely 
associative membership of the Union.91 One might add that the Charter itself offers a 
concrete vision of how the Union’s values could be tailored to its interpretation, 
through its thematic sets of provisions. Entitled ‘dignity’; ‘freedom’92; ‘equality’; 
‘solidarity’; ‘citizens’ rights’; and ‘justice’, these themes appear to describe the key 
aim or value that should be referred to in interpreting a provision contained in each 
chapter. That is not to say that the Court might not choose a different set of values, if 
adequately justified, but that the Charter’s text itself can provide the basis for 
interpretations of rights that are more thoroughly grounded in public (rather than 
individual) goals, and which can be substantively related to the process of political 
constitutionalisation during which the Charter was drafted.
What, then, might the interpretation of the cases I have considered above have 
looked like, if public reason had driven the Court’s discourse? Firstly, where a case 
only concerns the encroachment of a fundamental right upon other interests in the 
application of EU law,93 reaching a decision would have involved a clearer 
interpretation of the ambit of that right in the light of the value that defines its key 
89
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qualities. In other words, the Court would need to explain why the interpretation it 
offers serves the values, say, of justice or solidarity, as the case may be. Secondly, in 
cases involving a conflict both of rights and of the underlying values themselves (such 
as in Alemo-Herron or Bougnaoui and Achbita), an adequate decision would be one 
that can ostensibly reconcile that clash by safeguarding the core elements of both of 
the protected rights. In Alemo-Herron, for example, public justification as a method of 
constitutional reasoning would have comprised a positive examination of the 
meaning, firstly, of the rights at stake. Article 28 on collective bargaining would need 
to be defined paying due regard to the value of solidarity in an EU-wide context (and 
constitutional comparison would have been very useful in order to pin this down in a 
measured way). At the same time, a similarly detailed assessment of Article 16 on the 
freedom to conduct a business would have been needed, examined in light of the 
value of freedom. The outcome of the case might have been the same, if the concept 
of freedom employed in the European Union was deemed to be one that allows broad 
corporate freedom. In that case, though, safeguards for the core layers of solidarity, as 
manifested inter alia in aspects of collective bargaining, would have needed to be 
spelt out to prevent the erosion of this provision by implication, in contrast to the 
actual ruling.  
Of course, even if the Court did apply this form of reasoning, finding the 
interpretation that most authentically serves the public good, of which there are bound 
to be multiple versions,94 would be likely to continue to give rise to contestation by 
national courts. My argument is not that interpretations of the Charter offered through 
public justification would be singular or unchallengeable. The benefit of this approach 
is that it requires that what claims to be a true interpretation of rights be both capable 
of justification in terms acceptable to others and procedurally coherent.95 It means, to 
put it simply, that the Court’s interpretations of the Charter ‘earn’ their primacy based 
on a cogent set of relevant considerations, rather than, as Williams had put it, 
allowing fundamental rights to be driven by the fear of ‘consequence’.96 In this field, 
public justification might render challenges more constructive by ensuring that 
94
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disagreements are openly explained and responded to, thus giving rise to a 
relationship between national constitutional courts and the CJEU that moves beyond 
the parameters of constitutional conflict. After all, fundamental rights have been not 
only a source of dissonance in the EU legal order, but also one of unity97 – and the 
Charter can be seen as the most wide-ranging affirmation of this dimension. 
Indeed, insofar as the moral justification offered for conflict, from the 
perspective of national courts, is that the CJEU’s reasoning risks insufficiently 
safeguarding what national constitutions hold dear, there is great value in more 
reasoning in itself, and of more evaluative reasoning particularly, even from the 
perspective of maintaining the effectiveness of the EU fundamental rights regime in 
the longer run.98 It could resolve preconceptions or misunderstandings about what 
particular constitutions entail, what level of protection of rights they afford, and why 
such a standard has been selected.99 In turn, when the reasons for the interpretations in 
question are verifiable, judicial debate about their respective merits can only enrich 
EU constitutional law, different layers of which rest with different constitutional 
actors.100 It would create an opportunity for national courts to assume a more active 
role in the maintenance of fundamental rights in the EU and to claim ownership of the 
Charter for what may be a majority of cases involving fundamental rights (those 
where there is parity between the EU interpretation of a right and the national 
interpretation).101 It would also enable national courts to assess the logic of EU law in 
a more confident manner, thus placing them in a better position to fulfil their task of 
delivering rights within their jurisdiction, in line with the settled case law of the Court 
of Justice that ‘it is for the national courts to provide the legal protection which 
individuals derive from the rules of EU law and to ensure that those rules are fully 
effective.’102  Seen in this way, the Charter might eventually offer the possibility of 
97
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what Walker has described as the ultimate form of legitimation: that of allowing EU 
constitutional law to become a forum for the juxtaposition of arguments and for the 
crystallisation of reasonable, democratic opinion.103 
V. Conclusion 
This article has argued that a different form of constitutional reasoning about the 
Charter is required in order to represent sufficiently the role that this instrument was 
set out to play in the EU public sphere. In interpreting the Charter’s provisions, it is 
essential to make links to the goals associated with its drafting in the case law and to 
do so explicitly, through rational justification of the role of rights in the Union. This 
approach has not been assumed in the Court’s case law so far. Rather than using it as 
an incentive for public justification of its interpretations of rights, the Court has 
sought to fit the Charter into an earlier constitutionalisation discourse built upon a 
collation of individual interests in the application of EU law, but lacking an 
intelligible conception of the public good. 
The article has highlighted the impossibility of accommodating the Charter – 
as an instrument with a public law character – within such a paradigm of rights 
protection. While that is particularly evident in respect of provisions related to 
solidarity, which necessitate a conception of social and redistributive justice,104 as I 
have sought to clarify, it would be an error to assume that the Court’s methodology 
poses problems only for the Charter’s Solidarity chapter. Rather, it reveals a broader 
discomfort with acknowledging the symbolic role of a negotiated list of fundamental 
rights as expressing a polity’s constitutional equilibrium, i.e. how much a given set of 
guarantees matter to the version of ‘us’ (real or imagined) that is presented therein. In 
such a context, public justification would shift the judicial exercise from what is a 
good or appropriate balance of interests on a particular instance – as the case law 
currently appears to do – to a somewhat more modest, albeit intricate, task: that of 
accepting the constitutional framework as in itself offering the narrative, with the 
Court seeking to express it the way that most coherently serves its overarching aims.
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Of course, developing a judicial discourse about fundamental rights is a 
complicated exercise in transitional constitutional orders, where political goals and 
institutional roles remain somewhat fluid, and especially where, contrary to the 
statements made in the Charter’s Preamble, the authorship of the constitutional 
settlement by, or its effective attribution to ‘the peoples of Europe’ might be 
empirically challenged.105 It has indeed been argued that the Charter was used as a 
shortcut to democracy rather than indicating a substantive concern with political 
inclusion.106 Furthermore, it is questionable whether the Charter was in fact capable of 
delivering outcomes such as heightened legitimacy, constitutional identification, or a 
sense of post-national belonging. Its drafting process has been criticised precisely for 
a lack of civic participation and, thus, for a lack of representativeness.107 It should 
also be acknowledged that the absence of a coherent constitutional narrative in the 
Lisbon Treaty may have left the Court, to some extent, understandably hesitant as 
regards the Charter’s legal value, and particularly its relationship to the case law that 
preceded it, which the Charter’s Explanations endorsed in terms of content.108 In light 
of all this, one might be left wondering what the Charter’s present value is as a means 
of politicisation at all.109
It is true that the arguments I have expressed above would better resonate with 
a different, more wide-ranging framework for EU constitutional law, and one in 
which constitutional priorities as well as popular support could be more convincingly 
located. Tackling the political deficit in the Court’s conception of constitutionality 
nonetheless remains an important task, regardless of whether we fully espouse the 
Charter’s constructional dimensions at present. We can only enter the public sphere 
through an existing rights paradigm – it is through communication in the public 
sphere that we re-evaluate it.110 By using the institutional mechanisms we do have 
(albeit partial and imperfect) as the basis of a more coherent constitutional exchange 
about rights, both the existing institutions as well as the Union’s broader 
constitutional direction can be reimagined.111 As Walker has put it, ‘if sufficiently 
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open in consultation, intensive in consideration, and iterative in response to changing 
circumstances, a rule-of-law grounded procedural constitutionalism may be seen as 
the platform not for a post-democratic conception of decision-making but for a post-
representative conception of democratic decision-making.’112
112
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